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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MANNES - VALE, IMC. and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Defendants/Appellants, # Supreme Court No. 2Q917 
vs. 
ROBERT K. VALE and/or the 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : 
Applicant/Respondents. : 
ST^EMENT^OF^ISSUES^ 
This case presents only one issue on appeal. The issue is 
whether the Industrial Commission had the requisit "continuing 
jurisdiction11 necessary to enter its recent order of July 12r 
1985, holding that State Insurance Fund was under a continuing 
obligation to pay medical benefits to applicant. 
STATEMENT^OF^FACTS 
Applicant, Robert K. Vale, suffered an industrial injury to 
his eye, ear and shoulder on June 3, 1968. (R.3, 31, 33). Mr, 
Vale received medical benefits and temporary-total disability up 
to and including August 23, 1971. (R.33). 
No further claim for compensation or benefits was made by 
the applicant between August 23, 1971 and August 23, 1974. Some 
medical bills were submitted to defendant, State Insurance Fund 
in late 1974. State Insurance Fund refused to pay these bills 
because the three-year statute of limitations contained in Utah 
Code Ann., Section 35-1-99 had run as of August 23, 1974. (R.33). 
A hearing was held on November 29, 1971f in which applicant 
challenged State Insurance Fund's denial of further compensation 
and benefits. (R.9, 33). On December 9, 1976, the Administrative 
Law Judge issued an order dismissing Mr. Vale's application and 
denying any compensation or benefits. The basis for the Admini-
strative Law Judge's decision was that the Industrial Commission 
was without jurisdiction to act due to the running of the 
three-year statute of limitations. (R.33-37). 
Applicant Vale filed a Motion for Review on December 27, 
1976; and State Insurance Fund filed a Memorandum in Response on 
April 21, 1977. (R.39-46, 48-56). The Industrial Commission 
denied applicant's motion on May 17, 1977. Applicant did aQt 
appeal this decision to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Much later, on March 4, 1985, a second Application for 
Hearing was filed by applicant, requesting additional medical 
benefits. (R.87). The matter was referred to the Industrial 
Commission. It issued an order on July 12, 1985, holding that 
State Insurance Fund was under a continuing obligation to pay 
medical benefits to applicant. (R.93-96). 
Defendant State Insurance Fund then petitioned the Supreme 
Court for Writ of Review (R.110-120) and now submits its brief in 
this matter. 
SUMMARY_OP«ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission did not have the continuing 
jurisdiction necessary to enter its order of July 12, 1985, 
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because its earlier order of May 17, 1977 was res judicata on the 
issue of the Commission's jurisdiction over the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS PRECLUDED FROM 
AWARDING BENEFITS TO APPLICANT BECAUSE THE 
ORDER OF DECEMBER 12, 1976 IS RES JUDICATA AS 
TO ANY CLAIM BY APPLICANT IN CONNECTION WITH 
HIS INDUSTRIAL INJURY OF JUNE 3, 1968, 
The doctrine of res judicata renders a final judgement, on 
the merits, by a court of competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon 
the parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of the same 
issues. BejmiEd^^Atfcgbury, Utah, 629 P.2d 892, 895 (1981). 
The final ajudication of a claim for relief is binding on the 
parties and precludes a subsequent adjudication of the same claim. 
Church_vA M§adow_Springs Ranch^Corp^x^Inc.., Utah, 659 P.2d 1045, 
1048 (1983). Furthermore, res judicata is a rule of inflexible, 
absolute law. If a judgement is entitled to res judicata effect, 
then it is conclusive as to the causes of action involved, no 
matter how unfair or patently erroneous it may appear on later 
examination. Thus, a judgement may be res judicata even though 
it is based on an error of lav/ or mistake cf fact. See for 
example: M^?5§2«^ti2Qal_Ga§^QQiBpany_vA_State_of Arizzl_et_al. f 
123 Ariz. 219, 599 P.2d 175 (1979). 
The doctrine of res judicata applies to decisions of admini-
strative agencies, as well as to those of courts. Restatement 
SecondsJudgments, Section 83(1). See also: Larson, Woikmanls 
Compensation^Law, Vol. 3, Sec. 79.72(a). In the recent case of 
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ytahJDegt,. of J\dmiru Services_y._Public_Service_CommA, Utah, 658 
P.2d 6C1 (1983), the court stated: 
[T]he principles of res judicata apply to 
enforced repose when an administrative agency 
has acted in a judicial capacity in an 
adversary proceeding to resolve a controversy 
over legal rights and to apply a remedy. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 621. The United State Supreme Court has voiced a similar 
statement: 
When an administrative agency is acting in a 
judicial capacity and resolves disputed 
issues of fact properly before it which the 
parties have had an adequate opportunity to 
litigate, the courts have not hesitated to 
apply res judicata to enforce repose. 
2Dife§<L~States v.. Utah^Cgnst^ and^Mining^Co,., 384 U.S. 394, 16 
L.Ed.2d 642, 661, 86 S.Ct. 1545 (1966). The decision, then, of 
the Industrial Commission as an administrative agency must be 
given res judicata effect because the Commission was acting in a 
"judicial capacity" and resolved "a controversy over legal 
rights" when it made its decision denying any compensation or 
benefits to applicant Vale in 1976. 
In the context of res judicata, the phrase "final judgment" 
means that no further proceedings are pending or possible which 
might alter or upset the judgment. Any right of appeal must have 
been exhausted, or the time for exercise of such right must have 
expired. Restat§meDt^SesQndx^Judgm§Qts, Sections 13, 19. 
Applicant Vale's claim for compensation and medical benefits 
was denied on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction by the 
Administrative Law Judge in his order of December 9, 1976. 
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(^.33-37). Applicant appealed that order to the Industrial 
Commission, f?..?1.?-^) . Memoranda were filed by respective 
cc-.ir.LL.. • , ^  i - -: -
 r - -< • " M a ^  1 7, 19 7 7 f t h e I n d u s t rial 
Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge fs order denying 
app- ' or;:" ' -" - "': "•"'^ ".-'.u,:" • -na benefits. (R.58) . Under 
Utah Code ?.nn, , Section l:-'}-.^: \Ll'5lf as amended)/ an applicant 
has 30 days to appeal an order of the Industrial Commission to the 
Utah Supreme Court, Applicai it Va] e , howe* rer , never appealed the 
Commission fs order of May 17,r 1 977,, Therefore,, this became a 
?lfinal order" of no jurisdiction and must be res judicata as to 
any c 1 a i in £ or c o mp e n s a t i o n o r b e i l e f 11 s i i i c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e 
industrial injury at issue. See for example: PargQQg^Vj^BeQ&iQS 
feight, 103 Ari z. 3 30
 f 493 P. 2d 913 (1972); Calixto^y^. IodyjgA 
Comm^^of^Arig., 126 Ariz. 400, 616 P.2d 75 (App. Ct. 1980).. 
The holding in the Administrative La/\ i Judge's December 
1976 order concerned the i ssi le of the Industri a] Commission!s 
jurisdiction, as follows: 
The cases clearly show that the 
three-year statute does apply I n this case 
and that the application of the statute of 
limitations requiring a filing within 
three -years is _ _... jy r i§d iGfc 1QQ31...„§QSI. DQ t 
fliascetiQnacyfc^itb..the^«CQmnii8siQa. if the 
Claimant failed to file an application within 
three years after the date of injury or the 
payment of last compensation, no matter how 
equitable the claim may be, tb£-£o.Mli££iQEL-.i& 
without^jurisd^ 
the.-.£PPliQatiM 
>U X ~ * 
The application by the Claimant, Robert 
K. Vale/ for additional benefits for medical 
expenses, for permanent-partial disability 
compensation for temporary-total disability 
compensation should be denied. 
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Thus, the Administrative Law Judge's December 1976 order, affirmed 
by the Industrial Commission in May 1977, held that the Commis-
sion was without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Vale's application. 
Since the applicant did not appeal the Commission's order of 
May 1977 to the Utah Supreme Court, that order became res judicata 
and the holding concerning the issue of jurisdiction became the 
law of the case. The Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over 
this case in its later order of July 12, 1985 was barred by its 
own order of May 1977 which was res judicata. Thus, the 
Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to make its later 
order. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse or 
vacate the Commission's order of July 12, 1985. 
Applicant Vale may be tempted to argue that the Industrial 
Commission has "continuing jurisdiction" to modify or change its 
former order, according to Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-78 (1953, 
as amended) (See Addendum for complete text of statute.). 
However, this section merely provides that the Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction once initial jurisdiction has been 
established while limitation periods are running. 2uifc§3_Sfca££& 
Smeltingx^RefiQing aod Jiining^Co^y^Melgen, 19 Utah 2d 239, 430 
P.2d 162 (1967), affirmed 20 Utah 2d 271, 437 P.2d 199 (1968). In 
his December 1976 order, the Administrative Law Judge held that 
the Commission was without jurisdiction precisely because the 
statute of limitations had run. Again, in order for the 
Commission to exercise CQntinuing jurisdiction, it must obtain 
jurisdiction over the action in the first place. According 
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to the December 1975 order , which Iccer beca,.;e r--- u^oicv';:-*, c -;3 
Industrial Conuricsirn ;if.ver ootaineu jurisdiction -:v^: this 
ipsti J T , ". ie . -.'L.>:_ e, •. .. •_ "r; ••""'< ^y,'::'c~<5C' contt ir** ire* juris ~-
diction no afva;:e medical Den^i^s. 
A second possible objection involves the separate stater c: 
medical benefits, In tne Industrial Commission _ .-"c:^ .
 Lc\-r I 
JuJy IT:, 1 *' . allowing toe payment of medical ben3lit2 uo 
apu'iL./: :;. : v -ted K ^ n ^ ^ ^Copper,, C?-p_ y ._ Ir^y<y. _Cpnr;.. , r t ^ , 
59? ?./d C75 tii)'??) and Cnristenseo^^l'U^lDi^s^^^Cp^in,, , "J tan 
P*2d 755 (1932), These cv;c cases establish that for the yuipcse 
or limitative ,o::v,-: . ... * •-\r;-;'- - - --..., considered in a 
different light than weekly oorupensation Glider the Workers* 
Corrper r. ~1 i o - *i;;*• . I or n ec o t c . Coppe r _Cp rp^
 f s u pr a « ; he 16 t ha c onc e 
it is estc;o-i-..;..-.vi c' : a cher-"- . . • _e^ ..-c
 rt.iv ^ I: ;;.dui3" *  i - T v j :ry 
by accident, the rnodicnl benefits are iwl barred by the three-year 
Although the Administrative Lav Cudgel L/r.ceaoer, - . . . 1e • ion 
the Corliss icr.':•* affirmation of '.'-ay. 1°7"7? rrjv be contrary, to sub-
sequent ia'v :. c . -. <i u..- ^ -:.:^  a - in • l .- or*, ties. It 
remains the fact that the fora-e- nolding;? cr. toe L amission 
^-.r--'-:^ •-- >rv~ re? juuicato ef*ict» The Commission sirroly did 
not have jui^^.ct.;., tc enter _ - ,.ec-;; ;;der c-" h^. y ; ';;<5* 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's order of May 17, 1977 was a 
final order of an administrative ageno- > and, as suchr the 
doctrine of res judicata applies* Since the sucstance of the May 
1977 order was that the Commission was without continuing juris-
diction over applicant's case, that holding is res judicata* 
Possible objections that the Commission has continuing juris-
diction under Section 35-1-78, or that medical benefits are 
separate from and treated differently than compensation do not 
alter the res judicata effect of the Commission's May 1977 order. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to 
enter its order of July 12, 1985. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
should reverse or vacate the Commission's order of July 12, 1985. 
DATED this J S 3 _ day of December, 1985. 
BLACK & MOORE 
. & . — — 
James R. Black 
M 
Laurie A. Haynie 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Appellants, was mailed, postage paid, 
on the j;93_ day of December, 1985, to the following: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Ralph Finlayson 
Office of Attorney General, State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Robert K. Vale, Pro Se 
2544 West Campbell No. 37 
Phoenix, Arizona 85017 
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ADDENDUM 
10 
35-1*78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to 
modify award - Authority to destroy records • 
Interest on award. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing, and it may from 
time to time make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings, or orders with respect 
thereto, aj in its opinion may be justified, provided, 
however, that records pertaining to case*, other 
than those of totaJ permanent disability or where a 
ciaim has be<n filed as in 33-1-99, which have been 
closed and Inactive for a period of 10 yean* may be 
destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
Awards made by the industrial commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8*Ti per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 1W1 
